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Abstract. A nominative signature scheme allows a nominator (or signer)
and a nominee (or verifier) to jointly generate and publish a signature
in such a way that only the nominee can verify the signature and if nec-
essary, only the nominee can prove to a third party that the signature
is valid. In a recent work, Huang and Wang proposed a new nominative
signature scheme which, in addition to the above properties, only allows
the nominee to convert a nominative signature to a publicly verifiable
one. In ACISP 2005, Susilo and Mu presented several algorithms and
claimed that these algorithms can be used by the nominator to verify
the validity of a published nominative signature, show to a third party
that the signature is valid, and also convert the signature to a publicly
verifiable one, all without any help from the nominee. In this paper, we
point out that Susilo and Mu’s attacks are actually incomplete and in-
accurate. In particular, we show that there exists no efficient algorithm
for a nominator to check the validity of a signature if this signature is
generated by the nominator and the nominee honestly and the Decisional
Diffie-Hellman Problem is hard. On the other hand, we point out that
the Huang-Wang scheme is indeed insecure, since there is an attack that
allows the nominator to generate valid nominative signatures alone and
prove the validity of such signatures to a third party.
Keywords: Digital Signature, Nominative Signature.
1 Introduction
Under the assumption that public keys are publicly known, which is normally
realized by the public key infrastructure (PKI), a conventional digital signature
scheme allows a signer to generate signatures which are publicly verifiable. That
is, the validity of such a standard signature can be verified by anybody using
the signer’s public key and the associated message. Digital signature has a wide
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range of applications on the Internet and the electronic world at large. It also has
quite a number of variants which have been proposed for fulfilling different needs
requested by various kinds of applications. Variants include blind signature [3],
undeniable signature [5], proxy signature [10], and many others, not to mention
schemes involving multiple signers.
In 1996, Kim, Park and Won [8] introduced the notion of nominative sig-
natures and proposed the first scheme of this type. Here, we call their scheme
the KPW nominative signature scheme. A nominative signature scheme allows a
nominator (or signer) and a nominee (or verifier) to work jointly to generate and
publish a signature onto some public domain. A published nominative signature
is different from a conventional digital signature. Only the nominee, using his
own private key, can verify the validity of a published nominative signature.
Furthermore, if necessary, only the nominee can prove (in zero-knowledge) to a
third party that the signature is issued to him and is valid. In 2004, Huang and
Wang [6] extended the notion of nominative signature in a way that, in addition
to the above properties, only the nominee can convert a nominative signature to
a publicly verifiable one. With this additional property, a scheme of this type is
called a convertible nominative signature scheme. As mentioned in [8, 6], nom-
inative signatures might be useful in the scenarios where a signed message is
personally or commercially sensitive, such as a tax bill, a medical examination
report, an ID certificate, etc.
There are several other types of signature schemes that are closely related
to nominative signatures, such as (convertible) undeniable signatures [5, 1], des-
ignated confirmer signatures [4], and designated verifier signatures [7, 9]. What
they are in common is that all of these schemes are trying to prohibit public
signature verification. Instead, they prefer putting some restrictions on who or
how a signature can be verified, depending on the different needs of their target
applications. Specifically, a verifier can check the validity of an undeniable sig-
nature only with the help of the signer, while a convertible undeniable signature
can further be transformed to a publicly verifiable one only by the signer. For
a designated confirmer signature, a verifier can carry out signature verification
only with the help of a designated third party (or the signer). In a designated
verifier signature scheme, only the designated verifier can be convinced that a
signature is issued by the signer, since the designated verifier can simulate such
signatures too. Comparing with these schemes, a nominative signature scheme
hands over the control of signature verification to the verifier. So, we can consider
nominative signatures as the complement of undeniable signatures.
In ACISP 2004, Huang and Wang [6] pointed out that the KPW nominative
signature scheme is not nominative, since the nominator can also verify and prove
the validity of a signature to a third party. They further proposed a modified
version in their paper. In ACISP 2005, Susilo and Mu [12] claimed that the
Huang-Wang scheme is not nominative either. Specifically, they described several
algorithms and claimed that these algorithms can be used by the nominator to
(a) verify the validity of a nominative signature, (b) show to a third party that
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the signature is valid, and (c) convert the signature to a publicly verifiable one,
all without any help from the nominee.
But in this paper, we point out that Susilo and Mu’s attacks are incomplete
and inaccurate. On the one hands, we show that even a published nominative
signature is invalid, Susilo-Mu’s algorithms will still enable the nominator to
accept it as a valid one. We also show that the nominator cannot prove the
validity of a signature to a third party nor convert a nominative signature to a
publicly verifiable one using their algorithms. In particular, we show that there
exists no efficient algorithm for the nominator to check the validity of a published
nominative signature if the signature is generated honestly by the nominator in
the Signature Generation Phase and the Decisional Diffie-Hellman Problem is
hard. We say a signature is generated honestly if the nominator behaves exactly
according to the description of the Signature Generation Phase. On the other
hand, however, we point out that the Huang-Wang scheme is indeed insecure,
since there is an attack that allows the nominator to generate valid nominative
signatures alone and prove the validity of such signatures to a third party.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Sec. 2, we briefly introduce
the components of a nominative signature scheme and review the Huang-Wang
nominative signature scheme. In Sec. 3, we review the Susilo-Mu attacks de-
scribed in [12] that have been claimed to be able to break the Huang-Wang
nominative signature scheme. In Sec. 4, we show that Susilo-Mu’s algorithms
cannot be used to break the Huang-Wang scheme and also show that there ex-
ists no efficient algorithm for a nominator to check the validity of a signature
if the signature is generated jointly by an honest nominator and some arbitrary
nominee. Finally, we conclude the paper in Sec. 5 with some remarks and open
problems.
2 Huang-Wang Nominative Signature Scheme
In [6], Huang and Wang proposed a nominative signature scheme which consists
of
1. a Signature Generation Phase,
2. a Nominee-only Verification Phase and
3. a Proof of Signature Phase.
In the Signature Generation Phase, the nominator and the nominee interact with
each other. At the end of the phase, a signature is generated and published.
The signature can only be verified by the nominee during the Nominee-only
Verification Phase. In the Proof of Signature Phase, the nominee provides a
zero-knowledge proof to a third party that the published signature is issued to
him and is valid, that is, the signature is indeed generated by the nominator4.
The third party is assumed to have only the public information which includes
the public keys of both the nominator and the nominee.
4 To be precise, it should be read as “the signature is indeed generated with the
cooperation of the nominator”.
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Besides these three phases, the Huang-Wang scheme also has two additional
phases. They are
4. Signature Conversion Phase and
5. the Universal Verification Phase.
In the Signature Conversion Phase, the nominee converts the published signature
to a publicly verifiable signature. After the conversion, that is in the Universal
Verification Phase, everyone can check the validity of the signature using the
public key of the nominator. Including the last two phases, the nominative sig-
nature scheme is called a convertible nominative signature scheme [6].
For the formal definitions of nominative signatures, please refer to [6]. In the
following, we only review the five concrete phases of the Huang-Wang scheme.
0. Preliminaries: Let p, q be large prime such that q|p−1. Let g be an element
in Z∗p of order q. Assume that the discrete logarithm problem in the group of
〈g〉 is hard. By x ∈R X, we mean picking an element x randomly from X.
The public/private key pair of the nominator S is (yS , xS) where xS ∈R Zq and
yS = gxS mod p. The public/private key pair of the nominee V is (yV , xV ) where
xV ∈R Zq and yV = gxV mod p. In the rest of the paper, we assume that all
public keys are publicly known. Let H : {0, 1}∗ → Zq be a one-way hash function.
Let ‖ denote the concatenation between strings. An algorithm A is called an
efficient algorithm if A is a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm in some
security parameter. In the context of our discussions, the security parameter is
always considered to be the length of p in binary representation.
1. Signature Generation Phase:
(1) The nominee V randomly picks R1, R2 ∈R Z∗q , computes
a = gR1 mod p and c = yR2V mod p
and sends (a, c) to the nominator S.
(2) S randomly chooses r ∈R Zq, computes
b = ag−r mod p
e = H(yV ‖b‖c‖m)
s′ = r − xS · e mod q
and sends (e, b, s′) to V .
(3) V checks if the following equations hold.
e
?= H(yV ‖b‖c‖m) and a ?= gs
′
yeSb mod p
If both of them hold, V computes
s = s′ + R2 −R1 mod q (1)
and outputs a nominative signature σ = (b, c, s). Otherwise, output “False”.
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2. Nominee-only Verification Phase: Given a signature σ = (b, c, s) and a
message m, the nominee V computes e = H(yV ‖b‖c‖m) and checks whether
(gsyeSb)
xV ?= c mod p
holds with equality. If so, the signature is accepted. Otherwise, it is rejected.
3. Proof of Signature Phase: For a published nominative signature σ =
(b, c, s) for message m, let e = H(yV ||b||c||m) and d = gsyeSb mod p. The nominee
V can confirm or disavow the validity of σ via proving the equality/non-equality
of discrete logarithm logd c = logg yV or logd c 6= logg yV using the interactive
zero-knowledge protocol of Michels and Stadler [11]. We refer readers to [6] for
the detail on how this proof is conducted interactively.
4. Signature Conversion Phase: To convert a nominative signature σ =
(b, c, s) into a universally (or publicly) verifiable one, the nominee V just needs
to release σ and a non-interactive proof rm that shows logd c = logg yV , where
d = gsyeSb mod p and e = H(yV ||b||c||m).
5. Universal Verification Phase: Anybody can verify the validity of (σ, rm)
by checking whether rm is a correct non-interactive proof for logd c = logg yV ,
where d = gsyeSb mod p and e = H(yV ||b||c||m).
3 Susilo-Mu’s Attacks
A secure nominative signature scheme should only allow the nominee to verify
a published nominative signature during the Nominee-only Verification Phase.
In addition, it should only allow the nominee to prove to a third party on the
validity of the nominator’s signature during the Proof of Signature Phase. To
satisfy these two security requirements, the following two conditions should also
be satisfied.
1. In the Nominee-only Verification Phase, the nominator cannot verify a pub-
lished nominative signature.
2. In the Proof of Signature Phase, the nominator cannot provide a proof on
the validity of a published nominative signature.
In [12], Susilo and Mu described several algorithms and claimed that these al-
gorithms can be used by the nominator to compromise these two conditions.
They claimed that in the Huang-Wang scheme, the nominator can also verify
a nominative signature. Below is their algorithm for the nominator to conduct
signature verification on any published nominative signature.
Susilo-Mu’s Verification Algorithm for the Nominator:
For a published nominative signature σ = (b, c, s) and a message m, sup-
pose the nominator S stores the transcript of the Signature Generation
Phase of σ. Hence S knows the corresponding values of a and s′. Based
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on these information, S computes e = H(yV ‖b‖c‖m) and accepts the
signature if the following equation holds with equality:
gsg−s
′
a
?≡ gsyeSb mod p. (2)
Note that the verification mechanism above always accepts as long as σ
is valid, that is, the nominee accepts σ on message m in the Nominee-only
Verification Phase reviewed in the previous section. This can easily be seen from
the following facts. From Eq. (1), we have
gsg−s
′
a = gR2 mod p.
Also, we have
gsyeSb = g
R2 mod p.
Based on this observation, Susilo and Mu [12] concluded that the nominator
S can verify a published nominative signature without any collaboration from
the nominee V , and therefore, Huang-Wang’s scheme does not satisfy the first
condition stated in the beginning of this section.
Furthermore, they also claimed that by publishing the value of gR2 and a
signature of knowledge [2] by setting gR2 as the public key and σ as the message,
the nominator S, without any help from V , can also convert the nominative
signature to a publicly verifiable one. Therefore, they claimed that the second
condition stated in the beginning of this section cannot be true either. More
specifically, they described the following algorithm.
Susilo-Mu’s Conversion Algorithm for the Nominator:
To convert a nominative signature σ = (b, c, s) to a universally verifiable
one, the nominator S reveals σ with a signature of knowledge [2]
SPK{R2 : d = gR2}(σ), where d = gsg−s
′
a mod p. (3)
4 The Invalidity of Susilo-Mu’s Attacks
In this section, we show that both of Susilo-Mu’s attacks reviewed in previous
section are actually invalid. That is, neither of Theorems 1 and 2 in [12] is correct.
First of all, we notice that the nominator S cannot generate the signature of
knowledge with gR2 as the public key (Eq. (3)). This is because the nominator
cannot obtain the value of the corresponding ‘private key’ R2, since it is a random
number selected by the nominee V . Hence Susilo-Mu’s Conversion Algorithm for
the Nominator is invalid, contrary to their claim that in the Huang-Wang scheme
the nominator can convert a nominative signature to universally verifiable one.
Now, we point out that Susilo-Mu’s Verification Algorithm for the Nomina-
tor is also invalid. Specifically, we show that there exists a number of invalid
signatures σ̃ which can be clearly identified to be invalid by the nominee in the
Nominee-only Verification Phase but will still be determined as valid ones by
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the nominator using the Susilo-Mu verification mechanism reviewed in the pre-
vious section. In fact, we will see that there are a large number of such invalid
signatures and these invalid signatures can easily be generated by the following
invalid signature generation algorithm.
Invalid Signature Generation Algorithm:
Given a valid signature σ = (b, c, s) on a message m, that is e =
H(yV ‖b‖c‖m) and (gsyeSb)xV = c mod p. Randomly pick s̃ ∈R Zq\{s}
and set the output (i.e. the invalid signature) to be σ̃ = (b, c, s̃) with the
same message m.
Obviously, the nominee will reject the invalid signature σ̃ since s̃ 6= s. In the
following, we show that the nominator will still accept σ̃ as a valid signature.
Let r̃ = s̃− s mod q. Note that r̃ 6= 0. The left-hand-side of Eq. (2) becomes
gs̃g−s
′
a = gr̃gsg−s
′
a = gr̃gR2 mod p.
The right-hand-side of Eq. 2 becomes
gs̃yeSb = g
r̃gsgea = gr̃gR2 mod p.
Hence Eq. (2) still holds with equality. The reason becomes clear when we remove
the common factor gs from both sides of Eq. (2). Without the term gs, we can see
that the nominator’s verification mechanism only checks if g−s
′
a
?= yeSb mod p.
This equality can be maintained as long as the message m and the first two
components b and c of the original (valid) signature remain unchanged. As a
result, Susilo and Mu’s proposed verification mechanism for the nominator in
the Nominee-only Verification Phase is invalid.
Note that such invalid signatures could be revealed by the nominee V , the
nominator S who knows (b, c) and m, and any third party who accepts σ =
(b, c, s) as a valid nominative signature for message m after an interactive or
non-interactive confirmation with the nominee V .
In the following theorem, we further show that if the nominator is honest
in the entire Signature Generation Phase and does not know the private key of
the nominee, the nominator cannot determine whether an alleged signature is
valid or not in the Nominee-only Verification Phase under the assumption that
the Decisional Diffie-Hellman Problem (DDH) is hard. By honest nominator,
we mean that the nominator follows exactly the protocol described in Sec. 2
for the entire Signature Generation Phase. In other words, when the nominator
S receives a pair (a, c) ∈ Z∗p × Z∗p, S sends back a triple (e, b, s′) such that
b = ag−r mod p, e = H(yV ‖b‖c‖m) and s′ = r − xSe mod q where r ∈R Zq. A
signature σ∗ = (b∗, c∗, s∗) is called alleged signature if (b∗, c∗, s∗) ∈ Z∗p×Z∗p×Zq.
Theorem 1. Let Shonest be an efficient honest nominator and V ∗ be an arbitrary
and efficient nominee, that is, V ∗ does not necessarily follow the behave of V
described in the Signature Generation Phase in Sec. 2. For any alleged signature
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generated by Shonest and V ∗ in the Signature Generation Phase, if Shonest can
determine the validity of the signature in the Nominee-only Verification Phase
with non-negligible success rate, then there exists an efficient algorithm that can
solve the DDH problem with non-negligible success rate.
Proof. We construct an algorithm D which runs Shonest for solving the DDH
problem. Given a random DDH problem instance (g, g1, g2 = gu mod p, g3 =
gv1 mod p) in which there is half chance that u = v and the other half chance
that u 6= v. Below is the description of D with input (g, g1, g2, g3).
1. Set the public/private key pair (yS , xS) of the honest nominator Shonest to
yS = gxS mod p and xS ∈R Zq.
2. Set the public key of the nominee V ∗ to yV = g1.
3. D simulates V ∗ in the Signature Generation Phase and interacts with Shonest
as follows.
(a) V ∗ randomly picks R ∈R Zq.
(b) V ∗ sends (a, c) and a message m ∈ {0, 1}∗ to Shonest where a = g2gR mod
p and c = g3. Technically, Shonest is invoked with input (a, c).
(c) Shonest sends back (e, b, s′) such that e = H(yV ‖b‖c‖m), s′ = r−xSe mod
q and b = ag−r mod p for some random element r of Zq. Since Shonest is
an honest nominator, the equation gs
′
yeSb = a mod p must hold.
(d) V ∗ generates an alleged signature σ∗ = (b∗, c∗, s∗) by setting b∗ = b,
c∗ = c and s∗ = s′ −R mod q. This completes the Signature Generation
Phase.
4. D simulates the Nominee-only Verification Phase and invokes Shonest with
input (σ∗,m). Shonest is to determine whether the alleged signature σ∗ is
valid or not.
5. If Shonest returns that σ∗ is valid, then D concludes that (g, g1, g2, g3) is a
DDH tuple, that is, u = v. Otherwise, D concludes that it is not a DDH
tuple, that is, u 6= v.
Obviously, the running time of D is in polynomial of that of Shonest. Also
the simulation is perfect, that is, the simulated environment is computationally
indistinguishable from a real environment from Shonest’s point of view. We now
show that the alleged signature σ∗ is valid if and only if (g, g1, g2 = gu, g3 = gv1)
is a DDH tuple, that is, u = v.
On the one hand, note that if σ∗ = (b∗, c∗, s∗) is valid, then
(gs
∗
yeSb
∗)xV = c∗ mod p, (4)
where e = H(yV ‖b∗‖c∗‖m) and xV = logg g1 which is the discrete logarithm
of g1 to the base g. Since gxV = g1 mod p, yxVS = g
xS
1 mod p and (b
∗)xV =
(g2gR)xV g−r1 = g
u
1 g
R
1 g
−r
1 mod p, Eq.(4) can be rewritten as
gs
∗
1 g
xSe
1 g
u
1 g
R
1 g
−r
1 = g
v
1 mod p.
That is,
s∗ + xSe + u + R− r = v mod q.
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Since s∗ = s′ −R = r − xSe−R mod q, we have u = v.
On the other hand, if (g, g1, g2, g3) is not a DDH tuple, based on the simi-
lar derivation, we can see that Eq.(4) would not hold. Therefore, if Shonest can
determine the validity of any alleged signature non-negligibly, D can solve the
DDH problem with non-negligible success rate. This completes the proof. ut
This theorem not only indicates that Susilo-Mu’s verification mechanism can-
not help the nominator determine the validity of a published nominative signa-
ture, but also shows that there is no efficient algorithm to do so unless DDH
problem can be solved efficiently. This statement is true even the nominator
keeps all the transcripts of all the runs of the Signature Generation Phase, that
is, r and s′ are not deleted by the nominator after each run of the Signature
Generation Phase.
Remark 1. Actually, Theorem 1 can easily be strengthened as “The (honest)
nominator can determine the validity of an alleged signature if and only if he can
solve the DDH problem”. The reason is almost obvious: If the DDH problem is
solvable, then an alleged signature σ∗ = (b∗, c∗, s∗) can be verified by simply de-
termining whether (g, yV , gs
∗
yeSb
∗ mod p, c∗) is a DDH tuple, which is equivalent
to checking (gs
∗
yeSb
∗)xV ?= c∗ mod p. As in the above, here e = H(yV ||b∗||c∗||m).
Remark 2. Note that in the Huang-Wang scheme the nominator can “forge”
a nominative signature alone, i.e., without the nominee’s cooperation. This is
very easy, he can do this by first selecting random numbers R1 and R2 and then
computing values of a and c. After that, a valid signature is generated according
to the signing algorithm. For such a “forged” signature, the nominator of course
knows its validity and can confirm this fact to a third party since he knows
the value of R2. This is the reason why we emphasize the nominator should be
honest in Theorem 1. Therefore, the Huang-Wang scheme is indeed insecure,
since the nominator can generate a valid nominative signature alone, without
the nominee’s cooperation.
5 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we pointed out that in the Huang-Wang nominative signature
scheme [6], Susilo and Mu’s attacking techniques described in [12] cannot help
the nominator determine the validity of a published nominative signature, even
the nominator keeps the entire transcripts of all the runs of the Signature Gen-
eration Phase. We also showed that Susilo-Mu’s conversion method, which is
intended to convert a nominative signature to a publicly verifiable one, does not
work. Moreover, we proved that as long as the nominator is honest during the
Signature Generation Phase and does not know the private key of the nomi-
nee, not just the Susilo-Mu’s attacking algorithm does not work, there is no any
efficient algorithm that can help the nominator determine the validity of a pub-
lished nominative signature during the Nominee-only Verification Phase under
the DDH assumption. This statement is true even the nominator keeps all the
transcripts of all the runs of the Signature Generation Phase.
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On the other side, although we showed that, under the DDH assumption, the
nominator cannot determine whether an alleged signature is valid or not under
the condition that the signature is generated by an honest nominator with the
cooperation of a nominee, we also pointed out the insecurity of the Huang-Wang
scheme. That is, the nominator can forge valid nominative signatures and prove
the validity of such signatures to a third party alone, without the nominee’s
cooperation. Therefore, in the future work a rigorous and formal security model
needs to be presented, and generic constructions with formal proof for nominative
signatures are highly desirable.
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